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Abstract 
In 2004 10 new countries, primarily Eastern European countries, joined the European Union(EU) 
with much media speculation concerning how this would affect their economies. This paper will 
look at how the Common Agricultural Program( CAP) affects agricultural productivity by 
measuring four independent variables and by using the 2004 entry as a natural experiment. The 
paper will estimate how the CAP affects the average farm size, fallow land area, proportion of 
farming dedicated to organic farming, and GOP growth. This is expected to impact agricultural 
productivity through increasing returns to scale, input availability, efficiency ofland use and the 
Environmental Kuznets Curve respectively. The findings indicate an overall increase in 
agricultural productivity as a result of joining the EU from higher average farm size, lower levels 
of fallow land and higher proportions of organic farming. The estimation technique used was an 
ordinary least squares regression with fixed effects for each country. 
I - Introduction 
This project will look at the impact of subsidies on agricultural productivity. Specifically 
my analysis will look at the CAP in the EU and how it affects the productivity of the agricultural 
sector EU15 (the original EU member states) and EU8 (The 8 Central and Eastern European 
countries that joined in 2004). Specifically the variables examined will be GDP per capita (as the 
countries converge with the "old" EU countries' GOP level, pollution and pesticide levels may 
change and thus affect productivity), land use (how will mandatory fallow land policies affect 
productivity), proportion of organic farming (how will agricultural subsidies incentivizing 
organic farming affect productivity), and increasing returns to scale (how will the Euro per 
hectare policy affect the average farm size). 
Investigating the impact of subsidies on agricultural productivity in Central and Eastern 
Europe provides a very interesting case study of agricultural subsidies. One of the reasons for 
this is that all the Central and Eastern European countries joined simultaneously in 2004 and 
received economic assistance via the CAP from day one. This natural experiment presents a 
unique opportunity to investigate whether or not the CAP has had a negative or positive impact 
on agricultural productivity. This is also a very important issue as the CAP is engulfed in 
controversy and contention. This is both from within the EU as net contributors demand a 
reduction in the program as well as from international organizations such as the World Trade 
Organization charging that the CAP is an instance of unfair protectionism. This topic is also 
worth investigating because ofthe sheer financial magnitude of the pro!:,'Tam, in 2005 a total of€ 
43 bn was spent maintaining the program (BBC News 2005). Findings indicating an increased 
level of productivity due to inclusion in the EU and access to the CAP would help justify the 
program's continued existence. Conversely, findings indicating that the CAP lowers productivity 
would lend credence to the critics of the program advocating reducing the subsidies or 
restructuring the program. Finally, the CAP itselfbecame one of the main problems in the 
negotiation process of accepting the new members of the EU because they did not receive the 
full etiro per hectare support from day one. The CAP is thus a very significant policy possibly 
affecting the future of EU expansion. 
The CAP itself is also an interesting example of an agricultural subsidy as it has different 
characteristics, some of which would be expected to reduce productivity while others would be 
expected to increase productivity. This will be discussed in further detail in the theory section. 
Brief History of the Common Agricultural Program in the EU 
The EU (previously known as the European Coal and Steel Union) formed a uniform agricultural 
program for all member states in the late 1950's with the objective of providing farmers with a 
decent income, consumers with quality products at low prices, and preserving the rural heritage 
of Europe. The CAP later adopted has become a key component of the pan-European agricultural 
policy, and was destined to secure food supply for the European Continent. This program was 
seen as critical in the aftermath of the Second World War when food security was still a concern. 
While the main part of the CAP was a subsidy scheme to support agricultural prices, an 
important component of the program was also incentives to encourage free trade among the 
member countries. In time, the CAP became the main part of the EU budget (untill992 it took 
up 62% of the EU budget). The regional (national) differences between net beneficiaries and net 
payers of this program made the CAP quite contentious. As a result there has been both internal 
as we11 as external pressure (e.g. the World Trade Organization) to change the policy. However, 
since a relatively large majority of votes (and in some cases outright consensus) is needed, 
structurally changing the CAP has proven time consuming and challenging. 
The initial process of negotiating a CAP was difficult, it was first proposed at the Treaty 
of Rome in 1957, but not ratified until 1962. The problematic part was to have a common market 
while at the same time offering the same level of protection to the farmers which was enjoyed 
under the national level subsidy programs. Specifically, the compromise was reported to be 
between Gennany and France; Germany's industry gained access to France, but Germany was to 
help finance the subsidies paid to French fanners. The accuracy of these reports is hard to verify 
as the negotiations were behind closed doors. It is, however, beyond any doubt that Germany 
was and still is the main contributor to the CAP and France is the biggest beneficiary with its 
large agricultural sector. Today with the accession of the 12 new countries, France will for the 
first time in history become a net contributor. 
There have been several stages of development within the CAP. The year 1992 marked a 
breakthrough year as the MacSharry reforms were introduced. The main impact of these reforms 
was to bring prices closer to equilibrium levels and minimize overproduction. Instead of paying 
for overproduction of goods which led to the infamous sugar mountains and wine lakes which 
. ' 
were expensive to maintain, the MacSharry reforms paid to create reforestation, more fallow 
land and direct payments to farmers to ensure retirement. One of the main forces behind this 
change was the World Trade Organization's Uruguay Negotiation Round forcing EU countries to 
have a more reasonable agricultural policy which would not adversely affect agricultural sectors 
.in other countries. Previous EU policies of floor prices created a glut of food products which was 
dumped on primarily developing countries labeled as "emergency food relief' but ended up 
destroying farmers' livelihood. 
Between May 2004 and January 2007 the EU included 12 new member states, most of 
which come from Eastern Europe and are currently in transition economics. This was a very 
controversial move in many different circles. There was much skepticism within "old" EU 
member states as there was a fear it would be expensive to subsidize the new member states' 
agricultural sectors. The media also paid close attention to the economic impact of this 
enlargement. The negotiated consensus was a step-wise integration of the Eastern European 
countries in the CAP. However, in the negotiations it became clear that large Eastern European 
agncultural countries (in particular Poland) were unsatisfied with the slow full implementation of 
the CAP toward the new member states. After long negotiations the I 0 Eastern European 
countries have been admitted into the.EU and correspondingly as beneficiaries of CAP. 
The next section of this paper will outline the research question and some ofthe literature 
and theoretical work already done on this topic, followed by a discussion of the theoretical 
background, the model used, and the data used for this assignment before results are presented 
and some concluding remarks arc made about the findings. 
II - Literature Review 
A large number of both books and published articles have examined the issue of agricultural 
productivity in a variety of subtopics such as geographic locations or specific commodities 
(listed below). Even though most of these articles focus on a very specific subsidy within a given 
economy there arc some universal characteristics. There is also a consistent subset of literature 
concerning the EU expansion of the CAP itself and how this affects the level of productivity 
within the old as well as new economics in general and whether there is a convergence of growth 
rates. A third set of literature is specific to the use of pesticides and how this affects both short 
run and long run productivity. 
Subsidies in general arc thought to create inefficiencies in economic systems as the price 
signals they send can distort markets and their optimum conditions. With regards to agricultural 
subsidies in particular Hu and Antle (1993) find that there is an optimum level of productivity 
which can be significantly affected by agricultural subsidies. In moderate levels government 
policies can positively affect agricultural productivity due to innovations in crop yields, 
specialization and economies of scale. However, very high levels of subsidies have a negative 
atTect due to the inherent high tax rates, resource and technology constraints as well as the 
massive distortions to the incentives of farmers due to irrational resource allocation. This study 
was based on global World Bank data collected in the 1960's to the 1980's. Agricultural 
subsidies also incentivizes a certain type of agricultural structures, Breustedt and Glauben (2007) 
examine how higher levels of subsidies results in lower levels of exits, thereby indicating that 
stagnant high levels of subsidies would slow down the naturally changing composition of 
agricultural sectors, while it maintains that this is the case to a lesser extent with smaller farms. 
Relating specifically to the EU, the 2004 and 2007 enlargements have long been expected and a 
wide range of predictions have been made on the effect on the EU economies. Baldwin ct a!. 
(1997) assess the impact as exclusively positive for both entering countries as well as old 
countries from bigger markets, although entering countries would benefit the most. Pctrakos ct al 
(2005) look at the distribution ofbenefits among the countries, and conclude that there will be a 
core/periphery gap where the countries geographically closer to the West will benefit 
disproportionately. Leguen de Ia Croix (2004) in an official paper of the European Commission 
indicates the productivity of the entering Eastern European countries arc lower as they add 30% 
of total hectare of agricultural land, but only add in between I 0-20% agricultural production, 
though this does not control for input costs. 
In terms of environmental aspects of the CAP, Van der Grijp and den Hond (2000) and 
Serra et. al (2005) outline the significant reductions made in the I 990's of pesticides {kg/ha) used 
by EU member countries due at least in part to tougher EU regulations. How this affects 
agricultural productivity remains a contentious point. Grossman and Krueger (I 99 I) wrote the 
seminalwork on the Environmental Kuznets Curve outlining how higher levels ofGDP would 
,: f' 
lead to lower levels of pollution. Managi (2006) applies this specifically to pesticides showing 
tighter regulations abating the environment also removes decreasing returns to scale as many 
farmers overuse pesticides and are thus forced to reduce their input costs and are forced closer to 
': 
the point of optimum use. Huang et al (2002) and Dasgupta et. al (2007) highlight cases in China 
and Bangladesh respectively where lower levels of pesticides increased productivity as the price 
of inputs were significantly reduced while the crop yields were not impacted significantly. 
However, Shankar and Thirtle (2005) and Lansik and Silva (2004) determine that pesticides are 
under-utilized in South Africa and the Netherlands respectively. The optimum use of pesticides 
is very different according to the specific plant as well as climate, thus deviating findings do not 
necessarily contradict. 
Finally, another regulation of the CAP is that land needs to be fallow within a certain 
timeframe and subsidies in the EU depend on the extent of diversification, Pascual (2003) finds 
that diversification and leaving land fallow actually increases agricultural productivity in the 
long run based off data in the Yucatan in Mexico. 
This paper will take a look at these variables within the context of one specific 
agricultural policy. The entry date is the same for all countries examined, so 2004 presents a 
precise and uniform change in policy for EU8 while there should be no change in the agricultural 
policies for the EU 15 countries. This paper thus presents a unique perspective to test the 
applicability of findings of previous studies on EU member states. 
III - Research Design and Theoretical Model 
The CAP has a complex set of rules and regulations, but there are three components which each 
have different impacts. The first of which is the grant to farmers in the EU for arable land in 
good condition. In order to meet the condition of "good arable land" farmers must lay the land 
fallow after a number of years dictated by the EU. Since this condition favours larger farmers 
(Breustedt and Glauben 2007) due to increasing returns to scale, larger farmers can get larger 
grants while keeping all other costs fixed. The increasing returns to scale could come from bulk 
buying e.g. tractors and harvesters or from labour specialization on the farm. Thus the first type 
of grant for having land in good arable condition is a function of its incentive to promote 
increasing returns to scale. We would thus expect that inclusion into the EU would increase the 
number of big farms and decrease the number of small farms because these larger farms, ceteris 
paribus, have a competitive advantage. Because we would expect the average farm size to 
increase we would simultaneously expect this to increase productivity and pivot the supply curve 
to the right. 
Figure 1 Prrce 
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Moreover, farmers are mandated to, but also financially supported for, leaving part of 
their land fallow every cropping season. The reasoning behind this is that in order to have good 
soil the land should be left aside with no crops grown or animals grassing on it. This way the soil 
will recover its nutrients and long term productivity is increased. However, because output from 
this area is completely eliminated we would expect this in the short run to shift the supply curve 
left and quantity supplied would decrease. At each and every price level producers would be able 
to supply less output. The effect on productivity, in terms of income to farmers holding inputs 
constant is somewhat more ambiguous. The reason for this is that elasticity of demand might be 
inelastic. Food is generally considered a rather inelastic good as a whole, since there are no 
substitutes. Of course American produced potatoes are substitutes to European potatoes, but 
other protectionist components of the CAP (discussed later) effectively eliminate this as a viable 
option for the consumer. Thus, if the demand indeed is inelastic then a leftwards shift of the 
supply curve would reduce output, but increase income to farmers. 
Figure 2 
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The second component of the CAP is the promotion of ethical farming as organic farming 
is specifically rewarded with EU subsidies. Organic farming and ethical farming put further 
restrictions on farmers as they are not allowed to use pesticides, synthetic fertilizers or plant 
growth regulators. We would predict the CAP incentives for organic farming would increase the 
proportion of organic farming. This in tum would reduce total output as a series of inputs are 
now unavailable and the substitutes such as natural fertilizer are less efficient and/or more 
expensive. However, the effects on productivity remain unclear. The reason for this is that while 
the total output decreases, as in the number of potatoes harvested per hectare, the organic food is 
typically more expensive and sold in a different market. Thus total output can go down and total 
revenue and profits to the farmer go up because the price differential outweighs the reduced 
output. However, in the absence of a subsidy program we would expect farmers to be profit 
maximizing agents and grow either organic or non-organic crops on their land according to 
which is more profitable. This would in the long run make each individual farmer indifferent to 
the organic market and non-organic market because the price fluctuations in each commodity 
would be equalized by the price adjustment mechanism. Thus, if the individual farmer is 
indifferent to organic and non-organic farming in a world with no subsidies, a world in which the 
CAP exists there is an extra incentive to do organic farming, there would be a shift the 
proportion of farming dedicated organic farming away from the optimum point of allocative 
efficiency. We would thus expect a leftwards rotation of the Supply curve due to higher costs of 
production, even considering the higher price for organic foods. 
Figure 3 
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As Managi (2006), Huang et. al (2002) and Dasgupta ct. al (2007) point out pesticides 
are often overused 'so even if there is a reduction in total output, the larger reduction in costly 
inputs actually increases productivity. If, however, pesticides are used close to its optimum point 
or beneath it as Shankar and Thirtle (2005) and Lansik and Silva (2004) argue, further 
restrictions on pesticides would lower productivity. As Central and Eastern European countries 
join the EU a GOP convergence is·expected, while some predict this taking longer than others, 
there is widespread consensus it would take place. According to the theory of the Environmental 
Kuznets Curve, lower levels of GOP are associated with higher levels of pollution and chemical 
use in agriculture, while higher levels of GOP are associated with lower levels of pollution and 
pesticide use because of increased regulations as people value environmental protection higher. 
The relationship, however, is not linear but quadratic as higher levels of GOP are associated with 
higher levels of pollution at first, but then higher levels of GOP are associated with lower levels 
of pollution. Depending on where the countries are on the Environmental Kuznets Curve, 
increases in GOP could both cause higher and lower levels of pollution. As previously noted 
some types of pollution restrict productivity while others do not so it is difficult to predict the 
outcome of the direction of the rotation of the supply curve. It should also be noted that this 
variable is most clearly identified in the long run, and thus the effects may not be visible in the 
timeframe of this study. 
Figure 4 
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In this model it is expected that farmers are profit maximizers and would seek to 
maximize productivity under the constraints of the CAP regulations. This means farmers would 
thus exploit certain regulations that would lead to less productivity, if it would lead to higher 
profits via grants, but would, ceteris paribus, seek to maximize productivity. With regards to the 
direct payments, this would function as an outwards shift of the supply curve as a higher amount 
of money is rewarded for each good produced: 
Price 
Figure 5 
The reason why it is not certain the price would decrease is because the EU has 
guaranteed to uphold a minimum price (PS) through the price maintenance policies which seck 
to maintain a certain price level by buying excess production. While the influence of this subsidy 
has been decreasing it is still in effect today. This functions as a minimum price creating a 
surplus (PS-D- PC-S) which the government buys up. If the direct payment subsidies would 
push prices down beneath the floor price, price would not decrease, regardless of how much the 
supply curve shifts to the right. It should also be noted that this subsidy is only costly when in 
fact the EU has to intervene and buy up excess surplus, and the price of the subsidy would be 
amplified by the direct payments subsidy as farmers are not only paid to produce more, but the 
extra production is purchased by the EU. Thus we would expect both the direct payments and the 
price stabilization component of the CAP to increase quantity supplied, but there would also be a 
corresponding increase in inputs used. Increased inputs used may be accompanied by economies 
of scale from lower per unit costs from bulk buying, but it could also be the case that there would 
be diseconomies of scale. Certainly there would be a dead weight loss to consumers as 
graphically demonstrated, since the marginal cost curve is the supply curve and the marginal 
benefit curve is the demand curve. The triangle DWL makes up this portion of the subsidy 
measured amount of marginal cost excess of marginal benefit. 
Figure 6 
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Some of the independent variables can be expected to counteract, we would expect larger 
average farm sizes to increase productivity, but we would also anticipate a possible decrease in 
productivity from increased proportions of organic fanning. These factors pivot the supply curve 
right and left respectfully. With regards to quantity supplied we would expect the direct 
payments and minimum price effects to increase quantity supplied, but the overall quantity 
supplied might decrease if the supply curve pivots left enough to outweigh the rightwards shift in 
the supply curve and possible disequilibrium effect. Because there is this ambiguity the test for 
this study will be two tailed: 
HO: The CAP does not impact agricultural productivity 
H 1: The CAP does impact agricultural productivity 
The model used for this is a classical Cobb-Douglas production function: 
(Eq.l) 
Where Yu is the agricultural output produced by country i at time t, Ail is the Total Factor 
Productivity which represents the residual impact on output not caused by labour or capital 
inputs, L ail is the labour input, J(fl;1 is the capital input, and eu is the random unobserved error not 
captured by the variables in the model. In order to run this equation in a regression and estimate 
the exponents the equation has to be transformed into a Log-Linear form: 
Ln(Y;J = In (A;J F (o. In (L;J fi In (K;J) + eu (Eq.2) 
In this form the model can check for constant returns to scale and estimate the relative impacts 
labour and capital have on output. More importantly, having isolated labour and capital we 
would think of the different components of the CAP affecting Total Factor Productivity in the 
following way: 
Ln (A;J = Ao + Jc, In amount of fallow landit + A2ln proportion oforganic farmingit + Jc3 In 
average farm sizeu + Jc4 1n GDP per capitau + A5 EU variableit + eu (Eq.3) 
We can then estimate the effect of these variables on output in the final equation: 
Ln {Y;J = ).o + Jc, In amount of fallow landit + A2ln proportion of organic farming; 1 + Jc3 1n 
average farm sizeit + A4ln GDP per capitau + A5 EU variableu + o.ln Lu fJ In Ku +6; + eu (Eq.4) 
The only differences in this equation are the addition oflabour and capital as independent 
variables and the inclusion of 6; which represents the fixed effects. 
IV- Data and Summary Statistics 
The data available for this paper range from 2002 to 2005, the first two years of which the 
Central and Eastern European countries were not member states of the EU. The data for 
irrigation area, total farm labour force, number of holdings, and organic crop area had to be 
interpolated. This was done by taking the arithmetic mean of the surrounding years to fill the 
data gap, except for the labour force data, here the geometric mean was taken because intuitively 
we would expect population and labour force growth to grow more rapidly than arithmetically. 
There were also four countries eliminated from the sample: Estonia, Germany, Ireland and 
Luxembourg which was due to excessive gaps in the dataset which could not be salvaged by 
interpolation. This leaves the seven Central and Eastern European countries in the population 
examined: the Czech Republic, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia, and Slovenia, as 
well as ll Western European states: Belgium, Denmark, Greece Finland, France, Holland, Italy, 
Portugal, Spain, Sweden, and the United Kingdom. 
The agricultural production data is measured in terms of millions of Euros at basic prices 
which EuroStat defines as "the price received by the producer, after deduction of all taxes on 
products but including all ~ubsidies on products. Output of the agricultural industry is made up of 
the sum of the output of agricultural products, agricultural services and of the goods and services 
produced in inseparable non-agricultural secondary activities." (EuroStat- Basic Price 
Definition). 
The amount of fallow land is measured in hectares (ha) and is the amount of arable land 
in the crop rotation on which there is no crop growth and no animal grazing. The proportion of 
organic farming is calculated by dividing the total area of organic crop production in ha by the 
total area of crop production in ha. In order for crop area to be defined as organic the area has to 
fulfill all criteria ofEEC regulation No 2092/91 which includes not using any synthetic fertilizer 
or pesticide. 
In order to find the average farm size the total crop area is divided by the total number of 
holdings. The number of holdings is defined byEuroStat as "a single unit both technically and 
economically, which has single management and which produces agricultural products. Other 
supplementary (non-agricultural) products and services may also be provided by the holding" 
(EuroStat- Holding Definition). The average farm size is thus measured in terms ofha. 
' When controlling for the relative income of the country the data used in this study is 
using the Gross Domestic Product per capita at market prices. It reflects the total value of all 
goods and services produced less the value of goods and services used for intermediate 
consumption in their production. It is also controlling for different price levels in different 
countries by using the PPS (Purchasing Power Standards). The income is measured in Euros per 
capita. 
Irrigable area is chosen as a proxy for capital because it is closely correlated with other 
proxies for capital such as tractors, harvesters and threshers. EuroStat defines irrigable area in ha 
as "the maximum area which could be irrigated in the reference year using the equipment and the 
quantity of water normally available on the holding" (EuroStat- Irrigable Area Definition). 
The data available for labour is measured in terms of 1000 AWU (Annual Work Units), 
where an A WU is the work of a full time employee. Finally the EU variable is a dummy variable 
where a 0 value is given to non-member countries and a 1 to member-countries. 
Table I presents some summary statistics outlining the arithmetic mean and standard 
deviation for both the treatment group (EU8 -The newer members of the EU) and the control 
group (EU15- the older members of the group). The most important things to note are that the 
proportion of organic farming approximately doubled in the Central and Eastern European 
countries after joining while in EU 15 it increased from 15% to 18%, that the proportion of fallow 
land decreased dramatically upon entering for the EU8 members, and that the average farm size 
increased marginally after the EU8 countries entered the EU, while it stayed static for the EU15 
countries. Seeing a decrease in the amount of fallow land upon entering the EU and receiving 
benefits for leaving land fallow seems curious. However, it must be noted in this context that all 
countries prior to 2004 had their own national subsidies which could have had a higher incentive 
to leave land fallow. Moreover, there is also the possibility that the general national subsidies 
were not high enough to cover the variable cost of harvesting certain fields, and land was thus 
laid fallow out of economic necessity. 
Table 1- Summary Statistics 
EUS EU15 
2002-03 2004-05 2002-03 2004-05 
Mean Standard Mean Standard Mean Standard Mean Standard 
Deviation Deviation Deviation Deviation 
Agricultural 3713 4142 4230 4799 19320 19089 19281 19173 
Production 
(mio €) 
Fallow 391 718 253 436 472 729 461 714 
Land (ha) 
Organic 5.88 7.96 10.82 8.54 15.21 6.87 18.82 12.82% 
Crop(% of 
total) 
Irrigable 89332 105551 76564 79889 1057399 1378236 1052457 1375446 
Area (ha) 
Labour 464 741 461 773 437 450 413 424 
(1000 
AWU) 
Average 60 129 62 133 9 9 9 9 
Farm Size 
(ha) 
GDP Per 12000 2874 13707 3849 23045 3279 24564 3535 
Capita 
The following graph depicts the agricultural production measured in mio. of Euros received by 
all farmers in the countries divided into the EU8 group and the EU 15 group. As can be seen from 
the graph, both the treatment and control group have an increase in output following the EU 
expansion in the range from the year 2003 to the year 2004. While both groups have a similar 
increase in production in absolute terms- around 600 mio. Euros, the EU8 group has an average 
of 19% increase while the EU15 group has a 3% increase over the same time span. 
Figure 7 
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When looking at the variation of data in the different variables box-plots provide a useful 
way of graphically illustrating the relative concentration of data. We can here see two box plots 
that for two important variables, agricultural production proportion of organic farming (box-plots 
for all variables can be found in the Appendix). When looking at the box-plot for agricultural 
production we can sec that the interquartile range from q 1-q2 is a lot less pronounced than the 
other two interquartile ranges. Despite there being outliers for both agricultural production and 
organic crop area proportion, the data is reasonably varied. When looking at organic crop area 
proportion specifically we sec the opposite, namely that the interquartile range from q3-q4 is 
truncated, even so looking at the ranges and dataset as a whole there is no reason to reject the 
results or data because of lack of data dispersion. One variable did not show a lot of variation, 
namely average fann size which was mostly because there are low numbers associated with the 
11 Western European countries and high numbers associated with the EU8 population. 
Figures 8 and 9 
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The first regression run was Ln (Y;r) = ,\0 + ,\1 In amount of fallow land;r + ,\2 ln proportion of organic 
r· .. "' 
farming;r + ,\3 1n average farm size;r +' ,\4 In GOP per capita;r + ,\5 EU variable;r + a In L;r B In K;r +6; + e;r 
testing the significance magnitude of each independent variable on agricultural production- holding 
labour and capital constant: 
Table 2: Regression Results 
Variable Degrees of " Parameter Estimate Standard Error T Value P Value 
Freedom 
Intercept 1 7.221181 2.3374 3.09 0.0034 
"" 
lrrigable 
Area (ha) 1 0.019842 0.0146 1.36 0.1811 
Labour 
(1000 AWU) 1 0.270108 0.1522 1.77 0.0824 
Proportion 
of Organic 
farming(%) 1 0.036507 0.0129 2.82 0.007 
Fallow land 
; (ha) 1 -0.03991 0.0165 -2.42 0.0193 
Av. Farm 
Size (ha), 1 0.389279 0.1054 3.69 0.0006 
. 
GDP Per 
Capita (€) 1 0.00226 0.1703 0.01 0.9895 
EU Dummy 1 0.090498 0.0225 4.02 0.0002 
As can be seen from the results of the first regression, most of the independent variables were 
statistically significant. The R squared score was very high, above 99%, but there are two 
reasons to heed caution in assessing this model based on that statistic. The first of which is that it 
is a time series analysis, and as such it is not uncommon to have very high r squared scores. The 
second is that the output included 17 cross sections which were all siatistically significant at the 
0.01 level. These cross sections capture country specific effects, such as weather, which is not 
included in any of the independent variables. 
Looking specifically at the inputs of Labour and Capital we can see that the parameter 
estimates have a positive sign like we would expect, but especially Capital measured by Irrigable 
Area docs not seem to be particularly statistically significant. Because we would expect the 
coefficient to be positive, the p-value should be halved and the variable is thus just significant at 
the 10% level. However, since Capital is such an important factor in production it is still 
surprising to see such a relatively high p-value. This raises some concern of the accuracy of the 
proxy of Irrigablc Area to represent Capital as a whole. It also causes some concern of 
multicollinearity as this could affect the T-stats and thus also the p-values. 
The next variable is proportion of organic farming. As can be seen readily from the 
summary statistics table, the proportion of farming meeting the criteria for organic farming 
increased in both EU8 and EU15, though it doubled in the EU8 while only marginally increasing 
in the EU 15 group. This variable is statistically significant at the 1% level and interestingly 
enough has a positive parameter estimate, indicating that higher levels of percentage of farming 
being organic, holding inputs constant, will result in higher levels of agricultural production. 
This is very curious, as we would expect this to be a negative coefficient as outlined in the 
theoretical section. Possible explanation accounting for this statistically significant reverse result 
could be because the organic farming output market is still relatively new and the incentives 
made by the CAP is necessary for farmers to enter the market since there are significant barriers 
to entry and risk associated with price variation in the agricultural output market. However, from 
these results, it seems clear that that the higher levels of organic farming resulting from entering 
the EU actually positively affects agricultural production holding inputs constant. 
Looking at the fallow land policy variable, the amount of fallow land decreased in both 
the EU8 area as well as the EU15 area, but it decreased much more drastically in the EU8 area as 
can be summarized from the summary statistics table. The theoretical section outlined why an 
increase in fallow land would lower output produced as well as agricultural production 
(measured in mio. €) if the elasticity of demand is greater than I. Looking at the regression 
output the variable is statistically significant at the 5% level and has a negative coefficient. This 
would mean lower levels of fallow land positively affects agricultural production and by 
extension that the elasticity of demand for food is perhaps greater than one. Another possible 
explanation as to why it has a negative coefficient is that there arc still significant expenses 
associated with having the land such as property taxes, maintenances expenses etc. which arc not 
outweighed by the subsidy received by farmers for leaving the land fallow. Regardless of the 
relative importance of variables explaining the reasoning behind the negative coefficient, since 
entering the EU countries have reduced the amount of fallow land which increased the (short 
run) productivity of the agricultural sector of the EU. 
The next variable in the regression is the Average Farm Size variable. Upon entering the 
EUthe EU8 group's average farm size increased by 3%, while the average farm size for the 
EU15 group stayed constant. In theory, we would expect to see an increase in productivity from 
increased returns to scale since big farms have lower average fixed costs as well as lower 
average variable costs from bulk buying and specialization. The results seem to substantiate the 
theoretical work as the variable is statistically significant at the I% level and has a pretty high 
magnitude in the positive coefficient. The relative large magnitude reflects in partial the low 
average farm size in ha for most EU15 countries (the average being 9), so in increase of one 
hectare on average is relatively large increase. 
The GOP per capita variable was anticipated to have a negative coefficient since higher 
levels of GOP per capita arc associated with more stringent regulations on pesticides, water use, 
fertilizers, plant growth regulators etc. which would reduce productivity. However, it is also 
possible these same regulations would increase productivity if pesticides are in fact overused and 
regulations would bring the use of pesticides closer to the optimum use point. The results 
however indicate that neither of these theories is supported by the data available. The p-value is 
99% indicating that there is a 99% chance that the parameter estimate is caused by random 
variation in the data and not a relationship between GOP per capita and agricultural production. 
The last variable examined is the EU dummy variable controlling for whether or not the 
country is a member of the EU. What this variable captures which is not expressed in any of the 
other independent variables is the amount of subsidies received by farmers in terms of both 
direct subsidies, price stabilization subsidies as well as additional mobility of labour etc. This 
variable is statistically significant at the 1% level and has a positive coefficient indicating that 
being a member of the EU increases agricultural productivity as production increases while 
labour and capital are constant. 
Included in this regression was a test for constant returns to scale, which demonstrated 
that there is decreasing returns to scale since the output elasticities do not add up to one. This 
means that a 20% increase in inputs will result in less than a 20% increase agricultural 
production, ceteris paribus. 
_ '. -. The lack of statistical significance for_especially capital does seem to be problematic 
when looking at the reliability of the results. There is also some concern for multicollinearity, 
and a test measuring the Variance Inflation Factor for each variable shows how all variables 
except capital has a VIF under S.except for capital. Normally VIF scores above 5 should cause 
some concern with regards to the reliability oft-values while VIF scores above 10 indicate 
serious danger of unreliable t-values. In an attempt to mitigate some of these potential problems 
the capital and labour variables were substituted with a variable measuring the capital/labour 
ratio. 
Ln (Yit) = A0 + A1 In amount of fallow landit + A1 1n proportion of organic farming,, + t\ 3 1n average farm size,, 
+ A4ln GOP per capita;1 + A5 EU variable it+ (a In L/61n K) +O; + e;1 
Table 3: Regression Results 
Variable Degrees of Parameter Standard Error T Value P Value 
Freedom Estimate 
Intercept 1 10.99063 1.4145 7.77 <.0001 
Capital/Labour 
Ratio 1 0.031984 0.0137 2.34 0.0237 
Proportion of 
Organic farming 
(%) 1 0.043218 0.0129 3.35 0.0016 
Fallow land (ha) 1 -0.04521 0.0168 -2.7 0.0096 
Av; Farm Size 
(ha) 1 0.3091 0.1004 3.08 0.0034 
'·h '' 
GOP Per Capita 
(€) 1 -0.19099 0.1443 -1.32 0.1918 
' 
' 
EU Dummy 1 0.092099 0.0232 3.97 0.0002 
Overall these results verify the findings from the first regression, all the variables which 
were found statistically significant were also statistically significant in this model with the same 
signs for the parameter estimates. Similarly, GOP per capita is also statistically insignificant 
even though the p-value is significantly lower. In this model all variables had VIF scores below 5 
indicating the significance levels of the previous model were not too disturbed by 
multicollinearity. Of course, it should be noted that the capital-labour ratio is an imperfect 
substitute in this context since this ratio can stay constant while both inputs increase as long as 
they increase at the same rate. Thus, when looking at these variables it is not certain that the 
levels of input are held constant, but since both models give very similar results it seems 
reasonable to conclude both that the multicollinearity in the first model is not an issue and that 
the capital-labour ratio is a decent substitute for the variables individually. Additionally, both 
models were tested for hctcroskedasticity and the null hypothesis ofhomoskedasticity was 
accepted. 
VI - Conclusion 
In conclusion it can be determined that the population of Central and Eastern European countries 
joining the EU in 2004 benefitted not only in terms of market access and political security, but 
also in terms a higher level of agricultural productivity combined with a higher level of 
subsidies. There are three major components to the indirect effects of the Common Agricultural 
Policy which all caused this: the fallow land policy, the incentive to do organic farming, and the 
increased farm size. When discussing the benefit of the fallow land policy it should be noted this 
would reduce agricultural productivity for any country joining the EU which doesn't already 
have fallow land subsidy greater than that of the CAP. With regards to organic farming, higher 
proportions of organic farming cause higher levels of agricultural productivity because the prices 
in the organic output market arc stillso high that the higher revenues received by suppliers still 
outweighs the reduction in absolute crop, yield. One of the potential reasons why the transition 
into the organic farming market has not equilibrated in the short run is because of relatively high 
barriers to entry and price vagaries in the organic output market. The third variable is the Euro 
per ha policy which favours larger farmers who are more efficient than small scale farmers 
because of lower average fixed costs as well as lower average variable costs. Outside of these 
' ' 
direct effects, being a member of the EU also increases agricultural production while controlling 
for labour and capital inputs, primarily because of the direct subsidies promoting increasing 
returns to scale. In terms ofGDP per capita this variable was not discovered to have a great 
impact, but as indicated earlier the proposed relationship of the Environmental Kuznets Curve 
would be easier to spot over a long term time series dataset. It should also be noted here that 
while the CAP does seem to increase productivity through the mechanisms elaborated. this 
comes at a hefty price tag of over € 40 bn. Whether the CAP itself is justified is a question which 
lies outside the realm of this study, but some of the findings here may give clues to how such a 
question can be answered in looking at some of the specific components of the CAP. 
Future investigation of the relationship between the CAP and agricultural productivity 
could with benefit include organic beef and pork production in addition to just organic crop 
production. Moreover, a longer time range than the four years used in this study could establish 
some of the patterns exhibited here more clearly. Furthermore, a future study would also be able 
to include Bulgaria, Romania, and perhaps other countries joining the EU as separate treatment 
groups. Perhaps this study would then also be able to effectively support or reject the validity of 
the application ofthe Environmental Kuznets Curve to pesticide usc and environmental 
regulations in the agricultural sector. Further studies could also include climatic variables such as 
temperature, precipitation, wind etc. However, methodological obstacles such as the non-linear 
relationship of many climate variables as well as the geographic size and climatic distributions in 
countries remain. 
Finally, some cautionary notes should be given regarding the findings in this study. First 
of all the data used was, as described in section IV, interpolated. This always involves dangers 
for the validity of the results due to data inaccuracy. The dataset was also rather small in terms of 
years covered, which means overarching patterns may not be clearly deciphered in this study. 
Moreover, the capital proxy was imperfect; perhaps a weighted capital variable combining all 
farm instruments with irrigation materials could depict the capital used more accurately. 
I pledge to have neither given nor received unauthorized assistance during the completion of this 
work: 
Flemming Schneider Rhode 
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